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Abstract
We use the two-factor, two-sector, two-country model of Melvin and
Warne (1973) and Markusen (1981), in which the production of one good
is monopolized in each country, in order to investigate the role of the
price normalization. We illustrate several puzzling eﬀects that occur if the
price normalization is changed. However, we show that Markusen’s result
on the direction of the trade ﬂow between two proportional countries with
constant returns to scale is robust with respect to the choice of the normal-
ization rule. To overcome the price normalization problem in international
trade we suggest to use the concept of real wealth maximization.
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11 Introduction
We analyze Cournot competition between two countries within the framework
developed by Melvin and Warne (1973) and Markusen (1981). There are two
countries, i =1 ,2. In each country, there are two producers providing the con-
sumption goods x and y, respectively. There are two factors, capital and labor,
which are not internationally traded. The producer of y represents the perfectly
competitive sector in its country. The producer of x in country i chooses its out-
put xi in a strategic manner. For every strategy pair (x1,x 2), there is a relative
price system in each country such that all markets clear. In the case of free trade,
the relative price of x and y is the same in both countries, but other price ratios
such as relative factor prices are typically country speciﬁc.
In order to determine the equilibrium production levels of (x1,x 2) one has
to specify the objectives of the strategic ﬁrms. As is common in the literature,
it is assumed that each strategic ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts. If the ﬁrms were price
takers, proﬁts were unambiguously deﬁned. In that case, relative prices suﬃce to
compare the values of diﬀerent production plans. In the present case of imper-
fect competition, however, diﬀerent ways to measure proﬁts give rise to diﬀerent







Consider a strategy x1 of the strategic ﬁrm in country 1. The strategy x1
determines a budget line  (x1) for the ﬁrms’ shareholders consisting of all com-
modity bundles (x,y) the shareholders can buy out of their proﬁt income. This
line depends on the relative price system and on the size of the proﬁts gener-
ated by the strategy x1. The line  (x 
1) denotes shareholders’ budget line if the
ﬁrm chooses the alternative strategy x 
1. Since the price ratio corresponding to
x1 diﬀers from that generated by x 
1 the two budget lines typically intersect. In
2models of perfect competition, however, all budget lines are parallel and budget
sets are ordered by inclusion according to the amount of proﬁts associated with
a strategy.
Assume for the moment that proﬁts and income are measured in terms of
commodity y. That is to say, compare the two strategies x1 and x 
1 on the y-
axis. Since the shareholders can buy more units of y if the ﬁrm chooses x 
1,t h e
strategy x 
1 gives higher income to the shareholders than x1. Assume now that
the commodity x is used instead of y to measure proﬁt income. On the x-axis,
x1 gives higher income than x 
1. Thus, the normalization of prices and proﬁts
matters for proﬁt maximization.
We could have used any other consumption bundle (β,1 − β)   0 instead of
(0,1) or (1,0). Then proﬁts are measured along the ray y =( 1− β)x/β and
prices are normalized such that the value of the basket b =( β,1 − β,0,0) is
identically equal to 1. More generally, let b =( ˜ x, ˜ y,˜ k,˜ l)   0 be any commodity
basket. In the b-normalization, proﬁt maximization amounts to maximizing the
number of units of b that can be bought out of proﬁts. Diﬀerent baskets b give
rise to diﬀerent objective functions of the strategic ﬁrms. As a consequence, the
associated games typically have diﬀerent equilibria.
We illustrate the role of the price normalization problem by means of a par-
ticularly simple numerical example in which the basket b =( β,1 − β,0,0) is
varied. More precisely, we consider two completely identical countries i =1 ,2.









i ,w h e r eki and li
denote the amount of capital and labor, respectively. Factor endowments are






The equilibrium concept used in the present example and the bulk of the paper
is familiar from the theory of international trade [see, for instance, Markusen
(1981) and Wong (1995), chapt. 7]. The strategic ﬁrm in each country i chooses
its supply xi so as to maximize proﬁts in units of some basket b =( β,1−β,0,0).
If the ﬁrm compares the proﬁtability of xi with that of an alternative production
plan it considers factor prices as ﬁxed. Otherwise, general equilibrium feedbacks
are taken into account. Since both countries are identical, the trade ﬂow is
zero although free trade is possible. In the case of free trade, market prices are
lower than in autarky due to the competition between the strategic ﬁrms. In
the example, β takes the values 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1, respectively. To be able to
compare the welfare of the shareholders separately from that of other consumers,
we assume that the shareholders consume the proﬁts and the non-shareholders
consume the factor incomes.
First, we consider the traditional case of the y-normalization for reference
purposes. In this case β = 0. The autarky production is x ≈ 0.188 and the price
3of the strategic good x in units of y is px ≈ 2.12. In the case of free trade between
the two countries, the strategic ﬁrms choose x1 = x2 ≈ 0.34 and px ≈ 1.44.
Second, we assume β =0 .1 and focus on the case of autarky. Production
in the autarky equilibrium becomes x ≈ 0.24 and px ≈ 1.84.1 In comparison
to the previous case β = 0, good x is cheaper and consumers’ welfare is raised.
A computation shows that not only the factor owners but also shareholders are
better oﬀ although proﬁts measured in units of y have decreased. Therefore, a
move from β =0to β =0 .1 presents a Pareto improvement.
Third, we consider β =1 /2. We compare the autarky equilibrium in this
normalization with the free trade equilibrium in the y-normalization. If β =1 /2
autarky production levels will be nearly twice as high as in the y-normalization.
More precisely, x ≈ 0.37 is produced in each country in autarky. The resulting
price px ≈ 1.36 is lower than the corresponding price in the free trade equilibrium
b a s e do nt h ey-normalization. Accordingly, the welfare level reached in autarky
under the β =1 /2-normalization is higher than in the case of free trade and
the y-normalization. The welfare gain achieved in the y-normalization by the
introduction of free trade is surpassed by the gain obtained by replacing the y-
normalization by the β =1 /2-normalization while autarky is retained.
Finally, if β = 1 the production levels in autarky and under free trade coincide.
Moreover, px = py = 1 in both cases. That is to say, the monopoly equilibrium
in autarky and the duopoly equilibrium in the case of free trade are Walrasian
equilibria.
In this example, market power is reduced if β is increased. In the limiting
case β = 1, no market power remains. Clearly, it cannot lie in the interest of the
shareholders to maximize proﬁts in units of b =( β,1 − β,0,0) for β suﬃciently
high. However, the example also shows that a β suﬃciently close to zero does not
reﬂect the interests of the shareholders appropriately. The y-normalization that
has been used traditionally represents a polar case without particular economic
signiﬁcance.
Following the literature on international trade, we mostly deal with equilibria
in which each strategic ﬁrm takes its factor prices as ﬁxed whenever it examines
a strategy with regard to its optimality. Factor prices are expressed in units of an
a priori chosen basket b. We call these equilibria ﬁxed factor price equilibria or
FFPE. Sometimes we also deal with equilibria in which factor price adjustments
induced by a change of the supply xi are fully taken into account. These equilibria
are called variable factor price equilibria or VFPE.
A major goal of this paper is to study the impact of the choice of the price
index b on free trade and autarky equilibria. In particular, we analyze the system-
atic inﬂuence of the weight of good x in the index on equilibria that is illustrated
1As before, px denotes the price of x in units of the competitive good y.
4in the above example. Furthermore, we present an example in which the direction
of the trade ﬂow depends on the normalization that is used in both countries.
Similarly, we show that the direction of the trade ﬂow between two countries can
depend on whether factor prices are considered as ﬁxed or not.
If the strategic good is produced with increasing returns to scale the existence
of equilibria is not guaranteed. We show that the existence of a free trade equilib-
rium depends on the normalization that is adopted. This is due to the fact that
the proﬁt of a strategic ﬁrm can become negative if the normalization is altered.
The ﬁrm will not enter the market if it anticipates that it will make losses.
Furthermore, we consider two countries that diﬀer only with respect to the
size of their initial factor endowments ( ¯ Ki, ¯ Li). We assume that ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=
λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1)w h e r eλ tends to inﬁnity. We show that the small country does or does
not specialize in the production of the strategic good x depending on the price
normalization that is chosen.
A further goal is to examine the robustness of the result in Markusen (1981)
according to which the small country exports good x if factor endowments are
proportional and returns to scale are constant. We show that this result does
neither depend on the speciﬁc linearly homogeneous utility function nor on the
price normalization that are used. The result holds for FFPE as well as for
VFPE. It is worth emphasizing that, in the case of FFPE, the size of the trade
ﬂow and the gains from trade tend to zero if the x-normalization is approached.
Our ﬁnal goal is to discuss a way to overcome the price normalization prob-
lem. The basket b used to measure proﬁts and to normalize prices plays the role
of a consumer price index. Therefore, b ought to be related to the consumption
pattern observed on the market. The concept of real wealth maximization pro-
posed in Dierker and Grodal (1998, 1999) is independent of the arbitrary choice
of a price normalization. The resulting ﬁrst order condition coincides with the
one for the maximization of shareholders’ utility suggested by Kemp and Okawa
(1995). Real wealth maximization, however, can also be used if shareholders are
heterogeneous. A shareholder’s demand need not even be derived from utility
maximization.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and
deﬁne ﬁxed factor price equilibria and variable factor price equilibria. We state
the ﬁrst order conditions for both types of equilibria and show how they depend on
the normalization of prices. The proofs of the ﬁrst order conditions are relegated
to the Appendix. In Section 3, we present examples illustrating the eﬀect of the
price normalization problem. In Section 4, we examine the robustness of the
result in Markusen (1981) according to which the small country exports good x if
factor endowments are proportional and returns to scale are constant. In Section
5, we discuss the concept of real wealth maximization.
52 Model and basic properties
The model falls into the tradition of Melvin and Warne (1973) and Markusen
(1981). Chapter 7 in Wong (1995) provides a valuable reference. There are two
countries, indexed i =1 ,2, two factors in each country, and two consumption
goods, x and y, which are the only goods entering a consumer’s utility function.
In country i, capital ki and labor li are used to produce the consumption goods.
Country i has the initial factor endowment ( ¯ Ki, ¯ Li)   0.
Both countries have identical technologies. In each country i,t h e r ea r ea
strategic ﬁrm that produces xi according to the production function F and a
perfectly competitive sector that produces yi according to the production function
G. The production functions F and G are linearly homogeneous in (ki,l i)a n d
satisfy the usual properties.2 If the factor combination (ki,l i) is used in country
i to produce the amount xi = F(ki,l i) of the strategic good, the output of the
competitive good is yi = G( ¯ Ki − ki, ¯ Li − li).
Assumption (A1). The only strategic variables are the quantities xi.I np a r -
ticular, no ﬁrm chooses its inputs strategically.
In each country i, both ﬁrms minimize costs with respect to the same relative
factor prices. Therefore, production eﬃciency prevails within country i,t h a ti s
to say, (xi,y i)=( F(ki,l i),G( ¯ Ki − ki, ¯ Li − li)) lies on the production possibility
frontier of country i, which is denoted by PPF i. We assume that PPF i is given
by a C1 function Yi(xi) which is strictly concave due to diﬀerences in factor
intensities. The marginal rates of transformation are MRTi(xi)=−Y  
i (xi).
Factor prices in country i can be described as functions of the strategic variable
xi in the following way. Assign yi = Yi(xi) to a feasible xi.B yd e ﬁ n i t i o n ,( xi,y i) ∈
PPF i. Under the usual assumptions, there is a unique input vector (ki(xi),l i(xi))
such that xi = F(ki(xi),l i(xi)) and yi = G( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)). Let ri(xi)=
∂1G( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)) and wi(xi)=∂2G( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)), where ∂i
denotes the partial derivative with respect to the ith argument. Since marginal
products and factor prices coincide due to production eﬃciency, ri(xi)a n dwi(xi)
represent the rental rate of capital and the wage rate in country i measured
in units of the competitive good y, respectively. The vector (ri(xi),w i(xi)) is
proportional to (∂1F(ki(xi),l i(xi)),∂ 2F(ki(xi),l i(xi))) because (xi,y i) ∈ PPF i.
All entities are considered as functions of the quantities xi chosen by the
strategic ﬁrms. The market mechanism that gives rise to these functions can
be described as follows. Assume that the strategic ﬁrms in both countries have
decided to produce x1 and x2, respectively. Then, independently of whether free
2In Section 3, we exceptionally refer to a few speciﬁc examples in which increasing returns
to scale prevail.
6trade or autarky prevails, there is a system (1,r i(xi),w i(xi)) of relative prices for
the competitive good y and the factors in country i such that the competitive
ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts by producing yi = Yi(xi), the strategic ﬁrm minimizes
costs given the relative factor prices, and the factor markets clear. The optimal
factor combination of the strategic ﬁrm in country i is (ki(xi),l i(xi)) and that
of the competitive sector is ( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)). Thus, xi determines the
system (1,r i(xi),w i(xi)) of relative prices for the competitive goods (y,k,l)i n
economy i together with the production plans. The functions ki(xi),l i(xi),r i(xi),
and wi(xi) are assumed to be C1. Under free trade, aggregate consumption in
each country and the relative price of x and y are determined on the world market
for the consumption goods. In the case of autarky, market clearing in a country
determines consumption and the relative price of x and y in that country.
We describe the marginal rates of transformation MRTi(xi)=−Y  
i (xi)w i t h
the aid of ki(xi),l i(xi),r i(xi), and wi(xi). Since Yi(xi)=G( ¯ Ki − ki, ¯ Li − li)) the
marginal rate of transformation MRTi(xi)e q u a l s
∂1G( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)) · k
 
i(xi)+∂2G( ¯ Ki − ki(xi), ¯ Li − li(xi)) · l
 
i(xi).
Replacing each marginal product by the corresponding factor price in units of






Observe that only relative prices play a role in the previous part of the de-
scription of the model. This is due to the fact that the variables (x1,x 2)a r e
treated parametrically without regard to strategic considerations. The competi-
tive ﬁrms maximize proﬁts whereas the strategic ﬁrms have been only assumed to
minimize costs up to now. To do so, the relative price systems (1,r i(xi),w i(xi))
of the competitive goods suﬃce. The price normalization problem enters when
the objectives of the strategic ﬁrms are speciﬁed.3
As usual in the literature, we assume that the strategic ﬁrms also maximize
proﬁts. There are many ways in which proﬁts can be deﬁned. As illustrated in
the introduction, the quantity supplied by a strategic ﬁrm engaged in Cournot
competition depends on how the ﬁrm measures proﬁts. Let b =( ˜ x, ˜ y,˜ k,˜ l)   0
be any commodity basket. In principle, proﬁts can be measured in units of b.I n
this case, proﬁt maximization amounts to maximizing the number of units of the
basket b that can be bought out of proﬁt income. Therefore, one is led to ask
which choice of b lies in the interest of the ﬁrm’s shareholders.
3In contrast to the partial equilibrium literature, we avoid to speak of proﬁts or of the price
of an individual good without making the economic interpretation explicit. We distinguish
between relative prices of several goods or factors and prices that are normalized with respect
to a particular good or basket of goods.
7The set of admissible baskets b can be narrowed down by the following ar-
gument. It is apparent that proﬁts should not be expressed in units of a basket
of the form b =( 0 ,0,˜ k,˜ l) because this would be justiﬁed only if the sharehold-
ers of a strategic ﬁrm were not interested in the consumption of goods x and y.
Therefore, one can rule out that ˜ x =˜ y = 0. On the other hand, we assume that
shareholders do not own factors and, therefore, do not receive factor incomes.
Since shareholders do neither consume nor supply factors we have only to con-
sider baskets of the form b =( ˜ x, ˜ y,0,0)   0. Observe that only the relative size
of ˜ x and ˜ y matters for the objective of the ﬁrm. We parameterize a bundle of the
type b =( ˜ x, ˜ y,0,0) by β ∈ [0,1] and write b =( β,1 − β,0,0) and assume
Assumption (A2). The value of the commodity basket b =( β,1−β,0,0) with
0 ≤ β ≤ 1 i sn o r m a l i z e dt o1 .
In a substantial part of the literature, for instance, in Markusen (1981) and
in Wong (1995), proﬁts are measured in units of the competitive good y,t h a ti s
to say, prices are normalized with respect to the bundle b =( 0 ,1,0,0). We think
that there are no compelling reasons to do so, because the shareholders of a ﬁrm
consume x as well as y. Often utility functions are used in which x and y are
treated symmetrically. To illustrate the point, assume that bread and butter are
complements and that butter is provided under competitive conditions whereas
bread is supplied by large producers that exert market power. Why should the
producer of bread measure proﬁts in terms of butter rather than slices of bread
with butter?
It has been argued that the choice of a num´ eraire or a basket b is of minor
importance if one is only interested in qualitative features of a model such as the
direction of a trade ﬂow whose precise magnitude is of minor importance. How-
ever, speciﬁc examples presented in Section 3 show that a change of the basket b
in which proﬁts are measured can have signiﬁcant consequences. Furthermore, we
discuss and use a concept in Section 5, called real wealth maximization, that gives
rise to an endogenous way of measuring proﬁts such that proﬁt maximization lies
in the interest of the shareholders.
We describe the consumption side of the economy in detail. The residents
in each country can be divided into two disjoint groups, shareholders of the
strategic ﬁrm and factor owners. Ideally, a strategic ﬁrm is supposed to exert
its market power in favor of its shareholders. Since shareholders do not receive
factor incomes, they are aﬀected by the strategy of their ﬁrm only as far as their
proﬁt income and their consumption expenditures are concerned.
The aggregate consumption in a country does not depend on how income is
distributed among its inhabitants. This is achieved by assuming that all inhabi-
tants have the same linearly homogeneous utility function.
8Assumption (A3). In each country, there is a representative consumer who
generates the country’s aggregate demand. Both representative consumers have
the same homothetic, strictly quasiconcave utility function u(x,y) deﬁned on R2
+.
More precisely, for (x,y)   0, the marginal rate of substitution is a function
g(x/y)=∂1u(x,y)/∂2u(x,y) of x/y that has a negative derivative g .
There is no need to specify the utility function u further unless speciﬁc ex-
amples are considered. According to Assumption (A3), the market clearing price
px of good x in units of y is determined as follows. Consider the strategy proﬁle
(x1,x 2), which determines the aggregate output vector (x,y)=( x1 +x2,y 1 +y2)
where yi = Yi(xi). The market clearing price px(x1,x 2) of the strategic good in
units of y is given by px(x1,x 2)=g(x/y).
The literature on international trade with oligopolistic competition concen-
trates on equilibria in which a strategic ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt while disre-
garding the factor price changes induced by a variation of its output. According
to Assumption (A1), a strategic ﬁrm does not select its factor combination in a
strategic manner. Factor markets are perfectly competitive and the production
in each country i is eﬃciently arranged since the ﬁrms in country i minimize costs
with respect to the factor prices (ri(xi),w i(xi)) associated with xi. It is common
in the literature on international trade to stipulate that the strategic ﬁrms have
the following conjectures: If the strategic ﬁrm in country i chooses the strategy
xi it anticipates (ri(xi),w i(xi)) correctly. However, if the ﬁrm ponders about the
proﬁtability of a potential deviation from xi to x 
i it does not take into account
that the factor prices will adjust to (ri(x 
i),w i(x 
i)). We call the equilibria based
on these conjectures ﬁxed factor price equilibria or FFPE.
In the literature, FFPE in the y-normalization have been analyzed, but the
concept is easily extended to other normalizations. The y-normalization presents
the polar case β = 0. In Section 3, we examine in which way the parameter β
aﬀects equilibria when we move to the opposite case, the x-normalization. There
we show that the assumption of ﬁxed factor prices makes the price normalization
problem particularly severe.
Let (px,1,r,w)d e n o t eap r i c es y s t e mi nw h i c hpy is normalized to 1. The
corresponding price system in the b-normalization is obtained by setting the value









βpx +( 1− β)
(px,1,r,w).





βpx(x1,x 2)+( 1− β)
.
9where px(x1,x 2) denotes the market clearing price of x in the y-normalization.
We deﬁne the concept of an FFPE with respect to the b-normalization in case
of free trade.4
Deﬁnition 1. A ﬁxed factor price equilibrium or FFPE in the b-normalization
consists of a strategy proﬁle (x∗
1,x ∗





i)) and factor prices (r∗b
i ,w ∗b
i ) such that, for each i =1 ,2 and all







i ki(xi) − w
∗b


















−i denotes the strategy of i’s opponent.
Observe that the factor prices on the left hand side of (2) are the constants
r∗b
i ,w ∗b
i rather than the values rb
i(xi),l b
i(xi) associated with xi. In the following
deﬁnition of a variable factor price equilibrium (VFPE) all prices and quantities
are adjusted to their correct level and formal inconsistencies are avoided.5 In
this paper, emphasis is placed on FFPE because of their dominant role in the
international trade literature. We state the ﬁrst order conditions for FFPE as
well as VFPE. Their proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. The ﬁrst order conditions for an FFPE are
MRTi(xi)=px(x1,x 2)+∂ipx(x1,x 2)xi −
β∂ipx(x1,x 2)
βpx(x1,x 2)+( 1− β)
px(x1,x 2)xi. (3)
Deﬁnition 2. A variable factor price equilibrium or VFPE in the b-normalization
consists of a strategy proﬁle (x∗
1,x ∗





i)) and factor prices (r∗b
i ,w ∗b
i ) such that, for each i =1 ,2 and all



























−i denotes the strategy of i’s opponent.
Proposition 2. The ﬁrst order conditions for a VFPE are










βpx(x1,x 2)+( 1− β)
(px(x1,x 2)xi−ri(xi)ki(xi)−wi(xi)li(xi)). (7)
4Adjusting the deﬁnition of an FFPE to the case of autarky is straightforward.
5This equilibrium concept is an adaptation of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium in the sense of
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) to the present framework.
10In the y-normalization, Bi(x1,x 2) vanishes since β =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
diﬀerence between formulas (3) and (5) reduces to the occurrence of Ai(xi)i n
(5). Clearly, Ai(xi) becomes zero if the factor price changes r 
i(xi)a n dw 
i(xi)a r e
assumed away. More formally, we state6
Remark 1. In the y-normalization, the assumption Ai(xi)=0is equivalent to
the assumption that the derivative of the total factor income ri(xi) ¯ Ki + wi(xi)¯ Li
in country i vanishes.7
Proof. First we show that the following equation holds for the competitive sector:
r
 
i(xi)( ¯ Ki − ki(xi)) + w
 
i(xi)(¯ Li − li(xi)) = 0. (8)
Since the competitive sector has constant returns to scale, its proﬁts equal zero
for every strategy xi, i.e.
Yi(xi)=ri(xi)(¯ Ki − ki(xi)) + wi(xi)(¯ Li − li(xi)). (9)





i ( ¯ Ki − ki)+w
 
i (¯ Li − li) − ri k
 
i − wi l
 
i . (10)
Equation (8) follows from (1) and (10).
Equation (8) implies that Ai(xi) = 0 holds if and only if the derivative of the
factor income ri(xi) ¯ Ki + wi(xi)¯ Li vanishes.
3 Where does the price normalization matter?
To understand the role of the price normalization problem it is helpful to discuss
speciﬁc examples. Unless stated otherwise, our examples are based on the Cobb-





















in the duopoly case and px(xi)=

Yi(xi)/xi in the autarky case. These examples
ﬁt into the framework described above.
6A similar statement can be formulated for other normalizations.
7In an FFPE, a strategic ﬁrm behaves as follows: The perceived demand function is based
upon the correct factor income that is generated if factor prices adjust. The perceived cost
function, however, is based on the assumption that factor prices do not adjust. Therefore, the
factor income that is generated diﬀers from the factor income that is spent.
8For convenience, we often drop the arguments if no ambiguity arises.
11A major goal of the theory of international trade is to explain the direction
of trade ﬂows. Thus, we illustrate the sensitivity of the direction of a trade ﬂow
with respect to the price normalization. Assume that country 1 is endowed
with K1 =1 0 ,L 1 = 8 and country 2 with K2 =1 1 ,L 2 = 10. We compare
the traditional y-normalization with the symmetric normalization based on the
bundle b =( 1 /2,1/2,0,0). In the y-normalization, country 1 exports the strategic
good x. However, if the β =1 /2-normalization is adopted, country 1 imports the
strategic good. In this example, redirection of the trade ﬂow due to a change of
the normalization occurs for FFPE as well as for VFPE.
The equilibrium concept typically used in the trade literature with oligopolis-
tic ﬁrms is the FFPE in which ﬁrms do not take factor price adjustments into
account. One may ask whether this simpliﬁcation leaves the directions of trade
ﬂows invariant. In the following example, we use the y-normalization. The trade
ﬂow changes its direction if the FFPE is replaced by the VFPE. The example
is a slight modiﬁcation of the previous one. Country 1 is now endowed with
K1 =1 0 ,L 1 = 7 and country 2’s endowment K2 =1 1 ,L 2 = 10 remains un-
changed. As before, country 1 exports the strategic good x in an FFPE. In a
VFPE, though, country 1 exports the competitive good y.
The literature on international trade with oligopolistic ﬁrms also deals with
the case of increasing returns to scale in which the existence of free trade equilibria
is not always warranted. Therefore, we address the question of whether the
existence of a free trade equilibrium depends on the normalization. The example









with c =1 .1. It turns out that the existence of free trade FFPE with nonnegative
proﬁts for all ﬁrms depends on the normalization which is chosen. To be speciﬁc,
let K1 = L1 =1a n dK2 = L2 = 8. Then, in the y-normalization there is a free
trade FFPE in which both strategic ﬁrms make positive proﬁts. However, in the
β =1 /2-normalization the ﬁrst order conditions for an FFPE are satisﬁed at a
point where the proﬁt of the strategic ﬁrm in country 1 is negative. Hence, no
free trade FFPE exists in this normalization. The strategic ﬁrm in country 1 will
stay out of the market in order to avoid losses if it cannot exert enough political
inﬂuence to obtain a suﬃcient protection in form of trade barriers.
We return to the case of constant returns to scale and consider large diﬀer-
ences in size between two countries with proportional factor endowments. More
precisely, let the small country 1 have factor endowments ¯ K1 = ¯ L1 =1a n dl e t
the large country 2 be endowed with ¯ K2 = ¯ L2 = n. The small country exports x
in exchange for y and one is led to ask: Is the small country fully specialized in
the production of x if n becomes suﬃciently large? The answer to this question
depends on how prices are normalized.
Observe that the choice of the equilibrium concept becomes important for
large n for the following intuitive reason. Consider, for simplicity’s sake, the
12y-normalization. Since the small country becomes more and more negligible,
the price px converges to the autarky equilibrium price paut
x . In addition, the
inﬂuence of the small country on world market prices vanishes in the limit, that
is to say, ∂1px approaches zero. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition (3) for an
FFPE in country 1 reduces to the degenerate formula MRT1(x1)=paut
x if factor
price changes are not taken into account. Since ∂1px vanishes for n tending to
inﬁnity, the change of the factor prices becomes fundamental. For this reason,
we consider VFPE in the present discussion.
If n becomes large country 2 is approximately autarkic since the trade ﬂow
per capita becomes negligible. In the case of the y-normalization, paut
x ≈ 2.21 and
the corresponding output ratio (x2/y2)aut ≈ 0.20. If prices are normalized with
respect to b =( 0 .5,0.5,0,0) the price of x in units of y becomes paut
x ≈ 1.75 and
(x2/y2)aut ≈ 0.26. The output ratio (x1/y1) chosen in the small country for large
n is less obvious. A numerical computation shows that the small country becomes
fully specialized if n reaches 48 and the y-normalization is used. By contrast, if
the value of the basket b =( 0 .5,0.5,0,0) is normalized to 1, specialization never
takes place. More generally, one can show that country 1 becomes fully specialized
in the production of x for suﬃciently large n if paut
x exceeds a critical value of
approximately 1.89. Such is the case for all normalizations with β ≥ 1/3.
Finally, we address the question of why an increase in the parameter β raises
social welfare. For that purpose, we examine in which way β aﬀects equilib-
ria when we move from the y-normalization to the opposite polar case, the x-
normalization. The eﬀect can most easily be explained in the case of autarky.9
Proposition 3. If factor prices are kept ﬁxed and the relative weight of good x
in the basket b =( β,1 − β,0,0) underlying the price normalization is raised, the
optimal strategy of a strategic ﬁrm increases. Even in the case of autarky, the
FFPE approaches the Walrasian equilibrium if β approaches 1. In particular,
px(x)=MRT(x) at an FFPE if β =1 .









βpx +( 1− β)

.
The term in parentheses is positive for β<1 and converges monotonically to
zero if β tends to 1. In a Walrasian equilibrium, px = MRT(x). The wedge
between the market price px and the Walrasian price decreases monotonically if
β approaches 1 and vanishes in the limit.
Remark 2. If factor endowments are proportional and the x-normalization is
approached, all potential gains from trade become negligible at an FFPE. In the
limit, there is no trade between a small and a large country.
9Adjusting the deﬁnition of an FFPE to the case of autarky is straightforward.
13The fact that an FFPE becomes Walrasian if the x-normalization is ap-
proached can be explained on an intuitive level as follows. By considering factor
prices in the b-normalization as ﬁxed, a strategic ﬁrm links its output price px to
its input prices r and w unless x has no weight in b. If the weight of good x in
the basket b grows, this link is tightened. In the x-normalization, the strategic
ﬁrm takes the relative prices between its output x and its factors k and l as ﬁxed,
that is to say, the ﬁrm becomes a perfect price taker.
4 Trade ﬂows between countries with propor-
tional endowments and constant returns
In this section, we show that Markusen’s result on the direction of trade ﬂows
between countries with proportional factor endowments is robust with respect to
the choice of the normalization as well as the choice of the equilibrium concept.
That is to say, in the case of constant returns the smaller country exports the
strategic good x to the larger country in an FFPE as well as in a VFPE provided
that both countries measure proﬁts in units of the same basket b =( β,1−β,0,0)
and β<1.
We consider countries with proportional factor endowments. More precisely,
suppose ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1)a n dx2 = λx1 with λ>0. Then (k2(x2),l 2(x2)) =
λ(k1(x1),l 1(x1)) because F and G are linearly homogeneous. Since the marginal
products of G are constant along a ray through the origin we get r1(x1)=r2(x2)
and w1(x1)=w2(x2).
Remark 3. Ai(xi) satisﬁes the following homogeneity property:
If ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1) and x2 = λx1 then A2(x2)=A1(x1).








1(x1)k1(x1). Similarly, w 
2(x2)l2(x2)=w 
1(x1)l1(x1).
It is apparent from formula (11) that, in a Cournot model of international
trade, the market clearing price px(x1,x 2) of the strategic good x is typically not
a function of total output x1 + x2. Since production takes place domestically a
change ∆x1 = −∆x2 that leaves total output unaﬀected alters, in general, the
world market price px.
Remark 4. Let ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1) and (xi,y i)   0.T h e n ∂ipx(x1,x 2) < 0
and
∂1px(x1,x 2) ≥ ∂2px(x1,x 2) iﬀ MRT1 ≤ MRT2. (12)
In particular, if (x2,y 2)=λ(x1,y 1) then ∂1px(x1,x 2)=∂2px(x1,x 2) < 0.
14Our formal analysis only relies on the production side of the model and on the
fact that the market clearing price px satisﬁes (12). The utility considerations
underlying (12) are irrelevant.
Proof. According to Assumption (A3) the market clearing price of x in units of
y takes the form px(x1,x 2)=g((x1 + x2)/(Y1(x1)+Y2(x2)). Since g  < 0a n d
∂i(x1 + x2)/(Y1(x1)+Y2(x2)) > 0w eh a v e
∂ipx = g
  (Y1 + Y2) − (x1 + x2)Y  
i
(Y1 + Y2)2 < 0,i=1 ,2.
Moreover, ∂1px−∂2px = g ·(x1+x2)/(Y1+Y2)2·(−Y  
1 +Y  
2). Since MRTi = −Y  
i
and g  < 0 the sign of ∂1px−∂2px equals the sign of MRT2−MRT1. In particular,
if (x2,y 2)=λ(x1,y 1)t h e nMRT1 = MRT2. Hence, ∂1px = ∂2px < 0.
Observe that ∂1px  = ∂2px unless (x2,y 2)=λ(x1,y 1).10 On an intuitive level,
this fact can be explained as follows. If x2 >λ x 1 then MRT2 >M R T 1. Hence,
the world supply of the competitive good y decreases more if an additional unit
of good x is produced in country 2 rather than in country 1. Therefore, the world
market price px decreases more if the additional unit of good x is produced in
country 2, that is to say, ∂2px <∂ 1px < 0.
N o ww ed e r i v eM a r k u s e n ’ sr e s u l tf o rF F P Ei nt h ey-normalization.11 In a free
trade equilibrium, the consumption bundles in both countries are proportional to




1) is the equilibrium production
in the small country 1. If x∗




1 and country 1 exports
good x. Therefore, the small country exports good x if x∗
2 <λ x ∗
1.
Proposition 4. Let ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1) with λ>1.L e t(x∗
1,x ∗
2) be a free trade
FFPE in the y-normalization with (x∗
i,y∗
i)   0. Then the small country 1 exports
the strategic good x to the large country 2 in exchange for the competitive good y.














Assume by way of contradiction that x∗
2 ≥ λx∗
1.T h e nMRT2(x∗
2) ≥ MRT1(x∗
1).
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2) >MR T 1(x∗
1).
10As a consequence, the elasticities of demand for the home and the foreign ﬁrms must
take the diﬀerences between ∂1p(x1,x 2)a n d∂2p(x1,x 2) into account. This point tends to be
disregarded in the literature.
11Our line of argument corresponds to that in Markusen (1981) but makes use of Remark 4.
15We extend Proposition 4 to normalizations based on any basket of the form
b =( β,1 − β,0,0) and to the case of variable factor prices. Costs in units of
y are Ci(xi)=ri(xi)ki(xi)+wi(xi)li(xi). Hence, marginal costs are MCi(xi)=
MRTi(xi) − Ai(xi). In the case of VFPE, we assume that marginal costs are
increasing. This corresponds to the assumption that MRTi increases in the case
of FFPE because Ai vanishes if factor prices are held ﬁxed. Remember that,
for ﬁxed factor prices, the trade ﬂow peters out when the basket β approaches
1 according to Proposition 3. Thus, we restrict ourselves to 0 ≤ β<1 if factor
prices are held ﬁxed.
Theorem . Assume (A1) to (A3) and let ( ¯ K2, ¯ L2)=λ( ¯ K1, ¯ L1) with λ>1.L e t
the strategic ﬁrms in both countries maximize proﬁts in units of the same bundle
b =( β,1 − β,0,0),w h e r e0 ≤ β ≤ 1 in the case of VFPE and 0 ≤ β<1 in
the case of FFPE. In the case of VFPE, we assume that marginal costs MCi(xi)
are positive and weakly increasing. Then the small country 1 exports the strategic
good x to the large country 2 in equilibrium.
Proof. Let (x∗
1,x ∗
2) be a free trade equilibrium in the b-normalization. We consider
the case of FFPE ﬁrst. According to (3) in Proposition 1 we have
px +Γ ( ∂ipx)x
∗









because 0 ≤ β<1. Assume x∗
2 ≥ λx∗
1. By (12) in Remark 4,
px +Γ ( ∂1px)x
∗
1 >p x +Γ ( ∂1px)(λx
∗
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N o ww et u r nt ot h ec a s ei nw h i c h( x∗
1,x ∗
2) is a VFPE. According to (5) in
Proposition 2 we have
px +Γ ( ∂ipx)x
∗










2)w eh a v e
px +Γ ( ∂1px)x
∗
1 >p x +Γ ( ∂1px)(λx
∗
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1) > 0. Therefore,















Remark 5. In the case of ﬁxed as well as variable factor prices, a ﬁrm’s optimal
response to a strategy of its opponent increases if the normalization places more
weight on the strategic good x. As a consequence, the strategic good tends to
become cheaper in a free trade equilibrium if good x gains weight in the basket b.
5 Real wealth maximization
A ﬁrm acting in the interest of its shareholders will neither choose the y-n o rt h e
x-normalization because its shareholders consume a combination of both goods.
Consider, for example, the shareholders of ﬁrm 1 and let the strategy ¯ x2 of ﬁrm
2 be given. The aggregate demand of the shareholders of ﬁrm 1 for good x at
the strategy proﬁle (x1, ¯ x2) is denoted D1(x1, ¯ x2). Suppose for the moment that
ﬁrm 1 maximizes proﬁts in units of y and denote its optimal strategy x
y
1.S i n c e
the ﬁrm neglects the expenditures of its shareholders on good x the supply x
y
1
of x is too small and the price px(x
y
1, ¯ x2) is too high. More precisely, ﬁrm 1’s
shareholders could aﬀord to buy more units of the bundle D1(x
y
1, ¯ x2) if the ﬁrm
increased its production beyond x
y
1 and thereby lowered px. Similarly, if ﬁrm 1
maximizes proﬁts with respect to a basket b that places a suﬃciently high weight
on good x, the price px becomes so low that an output reduction enables its
shareholders to increase their aggregate consumption.
We say that ﬁrm 1 maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders given ¯ x2 if
ﬁrm 1 chooses its strategy ˆ x1 in such a way that its shareholders cannot aﬀord
to buy more units of D1(ˆ x1, ¯ x2) at any other strategy x1. In other words, ﬁrm
1 maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders if, by choice of ˆ x1, it maximizes
proﬁts in units of a basket b proportional to D1(ˆ x1, ¯ x2).
In order to maximize the real wealth of its shareholders the ﬁrm needs to know
the proportion x/y of both consumption goods in their aggregate demand, but it
needs no information on shareholders’ utility. The concept of real wealth maxi-
mization can be applied as well if shareholders do not possess utility functions. To
17use this concept in a Cournot model of international trade it suﬃces to stipulate a
linearly homogeneous demand function instead of a linearly homogeneous utility
function. Observe that the concept of real wealth maximization is not built upon
a representative agent. Shareholders may very well have heterogeneous tastes.
In the case of real wealth maximization, the commodity basket b used to nor-
malize prices and to measure proﬁts is not a priori given but determined endoge-
nously. The additional complexity can easily be taken into account by adjusting
the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal response. In the present Cournot setting,
marginal proﬁts will typically be negative at the optimum, since an inﬁnitesimal
increase of x1 reduces expenditures of the shareholders of ﬁrm 1 on their bundle
D1(ˆ x1, ¯ x2). Real wealth maximization takes shareholders’ expenditures explicitly
into account. In particular, the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization
states that the sum of marginal proﬁts and marginal savings of the shareholders
is zero [cf. E. Dierker and Grodal (1998)].
In contrast to proﬁt maximization, real wealth maximization depends on rel-
ative prices only. Therefore, it can be expressed in any price normalization.
Taking the y-normalization for the sake of convenience, marginal savings are
−∂1px(x1, ¯ x2)x
S1
1 ,w h e r ex
S1
1 denotes the x-component of shareholders’ aggregate
demand D1(ˆ x1, ¯ x2). In the case of FFPE, the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm i
becomes, according to Proposition 1, px +( ∂ipx)xi −MRTi(xi)=( ∂ipx)x
Si
i , i.e.,
MRTi(xi)=px(x1,x 2)+∂ipx(x1,x 2) · (xi − x
Si
i ). (13)
The interpretation of the modiﬁed mark-up formula (13) is simple. Share-
holders want their ﬁrm to exploit all other consumers but not themselves. Thus,
their own demand x
Si
i has to be subtracted from the total demand xi for the
product if ﬁrm i evaluates its marginal revenues.
Using (13) to calculate the FFPE with real wealth maximization in the stan-
dard example presented in Section 1 for the autarky case we obtain x ≈ 0.24 and
px ≈ 1.82. By contrast, px ≈ 2.12 in the FFPE in the y-normalization, that is to
say, the mark-up over the Walrasian price 1 is about 37% higher than in the case
of real wealth maximization. In the duopoly with two countries identical to the
one just considered, the FFPE with real wealth maximization is x1 = x2 ≈ 0.37
with px ≈ 1.37. For comparison, the mark-up in the FFPE based on the y-
normalization is 18% higher.
We turn to the case of VFPE with real wealth maximizing ﬁrms. As above,
the ﬁrst order condition for i’s optimal response has to be modiﬁed by replac-
ing xi by xi − x
Si
i . We continue to use the y-normalization to express the ﬁrst
order condition for real wealth maximization. Formula (5) in Proposition 2 is
18transformed into:
MRTi(xi)=px(x1,x 2)+∂ipx(x1,x 2) · (xi − x
Si
i )+Ai(xi). (14)
We compare the ﬁrst order condition for real wealth maximization and the one
for proﬁt maximization with respect to a ﬁxed basket bi =( βi,1−βi,0,0) which,






i )b et h e
share of good x in the aggregate demand of the shareholders of the strategic ﬁrm
in country i. It is easily seen that an equilibrium with real wealth maximizing
ﬁrms is identical to an equilibrium in which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts in the βi-
normalization. Both countries maximize proﬁts with respect to the same basket
b if ﬁrms maximize shareholders’s real wealth because the composition of demand
is identical in countries that diﬀer only with respect to their size.
In the case of FFPE, real wealth maximization also amounts to maximization

















i ). Observe that shareholders’
demand y
Si
i for good y i se q u a lt ot h eproﬁt in country i minus shareholders’
expenditures on good x,w h e r e a s˜ y
Si
i equals the revenue minus these expenditures.
To understand why y
Si
i is replaced by ˜ y
Si
i compare formulas (17) and (19) in the
Appendix. The last term in the ﬁrst order condition (17) for VFPE contains the
proﬁt pxxi − riki − wili as a factor. In the ﬁrst order condition (19) for FFPE
the corresponding factor is the revenue px(x1,x 2)xi.12
To overcome the price normalization problem in oligopolistic models with
representative consumers, Kemp and Okawa (1995) suggest to maximize share-
holders’ utility. Assume as before that proﬁt shares are the only source of income
shareholders possess. Then a VFPE in which each ﬁrm maximizes the utility of
its shareholders constitutes an equilibrium with real wealth maximization. More
precisely, let DSi be the aggregate equilibrium consumption of ﬁrm i’s share-
holders and let b be proportional to DSi.T h e n ﬁ r m i cannot, by unilateral
deviation, enable its shareholders to buy more units of b than are contained in
DSi. Discrepancies between proﬁt and utility maximization can be overcome by
an appropriate deﬁnition of proﬁts. Observe, however, that the concept of real
wealth maximization has the advantage that it can also be applied to a setting
in which utility maximization is meaningless.
12Due to the fact that y
Si
i is replaced by ˜ y
Si
i in the baskets underlying real wealth maxi-
mization in the case of FFPE, proportional countries do not, in general, maximize proﬁts with
respect to the same bundle b. The problem does not arise in the case of VFPE where cost
changes and factor income changes are fully taken into account.
196 Appendix
First we consider the case of a fully-ﬂedged general equilibrium model in which
factor price adjustments are taken into account. We derive the ﬁrst order condi-
tion (5) for a VFPE stated in Proposition 2 for a normalization based on some
bundle b =( β,1 − β,0,0). Proposition 1 is then trivially derived by setting the
derivatives of the factor prices in the b-normalization equal to zero.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
As shown in Section 2, the marginal rate of transformation between the two






We use this equation to derive the ﬁrst order conditions that are satisﬁed in a
Nash equilibrium if both countries use the same basket b to normalize proﬁts.
For simplicity, we begin with the traditional y-normalization associated with
the basket b =( 0 ,1,0,0). As explained in Section 2, the choice of the quan-
tity xi produced by the strategic ﬁrm in country i determines the factor prices
ri(xi),w i(xi) expressed in units of y, the factor quantities ki(xi),l i(xi), and the
output Yi(xi) in country i. Furthermore, the strategy combination (x1,x 2)d e -
termines the world market price px(x1,x 2)o fx in units of y.P r o ﬁ t s i n t h e
y-normalization in country i are
Πi(x1,x 2)=px(x1,x 2)xi − [ri(xi)ki(xi)+wi(xi)li(xi)].
Marginal proﬁts in units of y are







Thus, the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal response of a ﬁrm maximizing
proﬁts in units of y is
MRTi(xi)=px(x1,x 2)+∂ipx(x1,x 2)xi + Ai(xi). (15)
We turn to the case in which the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts measured in units of













i) · (β,1 − β,0,0) = 1.
20Consider a strategy proﬁle (x1,x 2) that gives rise to the relative price system
πi(x1,x 2) associated with (px(x1,x 2),1,r i(xi),w i(xi)) in each country i.T h e b-
normalization assigns the following absolute price system to πi(x1,x 2):
πi(x1,x 2)  → π
b
i(x1,x 2)=α
b(x1,x 2)(px(x1,x 2),1,r i(xi),w i(xi)).
where the normalization factor equals αb(x1,x 2)=1 /(βpx +( 1− β)).
We derive the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal response of a ﬁrm that
maximizes proﬁts in the b-normalization. The proﬁt Πb
i(x1,x 2) measured in units
of b is
α
b(x1,x 2)px(x1,x 2)xi − [α
b(x1,x 2)ri(xi)ki(xi)+α
b(x1,x 2)wi(xi)li(xi)].




















i = px +
∂i(αbpx)xi − [∂i(αbri)ki + ∂i(αbwi)li]
αb .
Inserting the deﬁnition of αb we obtain the following ﬁrst order condition for
a ﬁrm maximizing proﬁts in units of b
MRTi(xi)=px +( ∂ipx)xi + Ai(xi) −
β(∂ipx)(pxxi − riki − wili)
βpx +( 1− β)
. (17)
Therefore, (5) holds and Proposition 2 is shown.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1




















Using the deﬁnition of αb we obtain the following ﬁrst order condition for an
FFPE in the b-normalization
MRTi(xi)=px(x1,x 2)+∂ipx(x1,x 2)xi−
β∂ipx(x1,x 2)
βpx(x1,x 2)+( 1− β)
px(x1,x 2)xi. (19)
Thus, Proposition 1 is shown.
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